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CLAUDIA MAIENBORN 
ON DAVIDSONIAN AND KIMIAN STATES
*
Abstract. Davidsonian event semantics has an impressive track record as a framework for natural 
language analysis. In recent years it has become popular to assume that not only action verbs but 
predicates of all sorts have an additional event argument. Yet, this hypothesis is not without controversy 
in particular wrt the particularly challenging case of statives. Maienborn (2003a, 2004) argues that there 
is a need for distinguishing two kinds of states. While verbs such as sit, stand, sleep refer to eventualities 
in the sense of Davidson (= Davidsonian states), the states denoted by such stative verbs like know, 
weigh,and own, as well as any combination of copula plus predicate are of a different ontological type (= 
Kimian states). Against this background, the present study assesses the two main arguments that have 
been raised in favour of a Davidsonian approach for statives. These are the combination with certain 
manner adverbials and Parsons’ (2000) so-called time travel argument. It will be argued that the manner 
data which, at first sight, seem to provide evidence for a Davidsonian approach to statives are better 
analysed as non-compositional reinterpretations triggered by the lack of a regular Davidsonian event 
argument. As for Parsons’s time travel argument, it turns out that the original version does not supply the 
kind of support for the Davidsonian approach that Parsons supposed. However, properly adapted, the time 
travel argument may provide additional evidence for the need of reifying the denotatum of statives, as 
suggested by the assumption of Kimian states. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Hidden event arguments, as introduced by Davidson (1967), have proven to be of 
great benefit in explaining numerous combinatorial and inferential properties of 
natural language expressions. Probably the greatest benefit of the Davidsonian 
approach is its straightforward account of adverbial modification. If verbs introduce 
an event argument, as Davidson suggested, then adverbial modifiers can be analysed 
as simple first-order predicates that add information about this event.  
  The question that naturally arises, though, is whether Davidson’s proposal, 
which was originally confined to action verbs, can be extended to other types of 
verbal predicates. While this seems to be uncontroversial for process verbs, the 
critical case is that of statives. Following Higginbotham (1985, 2000) and 
particularly Parsons (1990, 2000), scholars working in what has been called the neo-
Davidsonian paradigm assume that arbitrary verbal predicates — which, crucially, 
include statives — have an underlying Davidsonian event argument.
1 This is 
illustrated by the following quotations from Higginbotham (1985) and Chierchia 
(1995). 
The position E corresponds to the ‘hidden’ argument place for events, originally 
suggested by Donald Davidson (1967). There seem to be strong arguments in favour of, 
and little to be said against, extending Davidson’s idea to verbs other than verbs of 
change or action. Under this extension, statives will also have E-positions.  
  Higginbotham (1985: 10) 2 CLAUDIA MAIENBORN
A basic assumption I am making is that every VP, whatever its internal structure and 
aspectual characteristics, has an extra argument position for eventualities, in the spirit of 
Davidson’s proposal. […] In a way, having this extra argument slot is part of what 
makes something a VP, whatever its inner structure.   Chierchia (1995: 204) 
Despite its popularity, the claim that statives have a hidden event argument is 
seldom defended explicitly. Parsons (1995, 2000) is among the few advocates of the 
neo-Davidsonian approach who have subjected this assumption to some scrutiny.
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While Parsons himself does not consider previous evidence for an event-based 
analysis of statives to be particularly compelling, he does consider his so-called time
travel argument (as developed in Parsons 2000) to make a strong case for such an 
analysis.
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  The aim of the present study is to assess Parsons’ arguments for this analysis of 
stative expressions against the background of the theory developed in Maienborn 
(2003a, 2004), which rejects the Davidsonian approach for copula sentences. In that 
work, I argue for a distinction between two kinds of states: While Davidsonian 
states denoted by verbs such as sit, stand, sleep are eventualities in the sense of 
Davidson, the states denoted by such stative verbs like know, weigh,and own, as well 
as any combination of copula plus predicate do not qualify as Davidsonian 
eventualities but are instead what I call Kimian states. As I will show, Parsons’ time 
travel argument turns out to support this distinction. 
  The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a summary of my account 
of Davidsonian and Kimian states as two ontologically distinct categories whose 
members natural language expressions refer to. Section 3 discusses certain cases of 
manner modification which, at first sight, seem to provide evidence for a David-
sonian approach to statives but which are, in fact, better analysed as non-
compositional reinterpretations triggered by the lack of a regular Davidsonian event 
argument. Section 4 is devoted to Parsons’ time travel argument. While the original 
version does not supply the kind of support for the Davidsonian approach that 
Parsons supposed, I will propose a time travel variant showing that statives indeed 
call for a reification of their denotatum, as suggested by the assumption of Kimian 
states. Finally, section 5 explores some of the consequences of the Kimian approach 
advocated here and of its Davidsonian rivals. 
2. TWO KINDS OF STATES 
The theory developed in Maienborn (2003a, 2004) is based on the observation that 
there is a fundamental split within the class of non-dynamic expressions. State verbs 
such as sit, stand, lie, wait, gleam, and sleep meet all of the criteria for Davidsonian 
eventualities.
4 In contrast, stative verbs like know, weigh, own, and resemble do not 
meet any of them. In particular, copular constructions, as we will see, behave 
uniformly like stative verbs regardless of whether the predicate denotes a temporary 
property (socalled “stage-level predicates”) or a more or less permanent property 
(socalled “individual-level predicates”).
5 The following subsection reviews the 
crucial eventuality tests and illustrates the distinct behaviour of the two classes of 
state expressions with respect to these tests.   O NDAVIDSONIAN AND KIMIAN STATES 3 
2.1. The Davidsonian approach 
On the received view, Davidsonian eventualities are spatiotemporal entities, whose 
properties are summarized in the more or less standard working hypothesis given in 
(1).  
(1)  Davidsonian eventualities:
  Eventualities are particular spatiotemporal entities with functionally 
integrated participants. 
Several ontological properties follow from this definition:  
(2)  Ontological properties of eventualities:
 a.    Eventualities are perceptible. 
  b.   Eventualities can be located in space and time.  
  c.   Eventualities can vary in the way that they are realised.  
These properties can, in turn, be used to derive the linguistic eventuality tests listed 
below. 
(3)  Linguistic diagnostics for eventualities:
 a.    Eventuality  expressions can serve as infinitival complements of per-
ception verbs. 
 b.    Eventuality  expressions combine with locative and temporal modi-
fiers.
  c.   Eventuality expressions combine with manner adverbials, instrumen-
tals, comitatives, etc. 
These assumptions about the Davidsonian notion of events are fairly standard; see 
Maienborn (2003a, 2004) for a more detailed discussion. The diagnostics in (3) 
provide a way to detect hidden event arguments. In what follows, I use German 
sentences for illustration; see Maienborn (2003b) for a discussion of the Spanish 
copula forms ser and estar.
  The behaviour of state verbs and statives with respect to perception reports is 
illustrated in (4). While state verbs can serve as infinitival complements of 
perception verbs (cf. (4a-c)), statives — including copula constructions — are 
prohibited in these contexts; cf. (4d-g). 
(4)  Perception reports:
  a.   Ich sah das Buch auf dem Tisch liegen. 
     I    saw the  book on  the   table  lie. 
  b.   Ich sah Bardo schlafen. 
     I    saw Bardo sleep. 4 CLAUDIA MAIENBORN
  c.   Ich sah die Schuhe glänzen. 
     I    saw the shoes    gleam. 
  d.  * Ich sah das Buch auf dem Tisch sein. 
     I    saw the  book on  the   table  be. 
  e.  * Ich hörte das Radio laut sein. 
     I     heard the radio  loud be. 
  f.  * Ich sah die Tomaten 1 Kg wiegen. 
     I    saw the tomatoes 1 kg weigh. 
  g.  * Ich sah meine Tante Romy Schneider ähneln. 
     I    saw my      aunt   Romy Schneider resemble. 
In addition, as (5a-c) shows, state verbs combine with locative modifiers, whereas 
statives do not; see (5d-g).
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(5)  Locative modifiers:
  a.   Das Auto wartet an der Ampel. 
     The car    waits   at  the traffic light. 
  b.   Bardo schläft in der Hängematte. 
     Bardo sleeps  in the hammock. 
  c.   Die Perlen glänzen in ihrem Haar. 
     The pearls gleam    in  her     hair. 
  d.  * Das Kleid ist auf der Wäscheleine nass. 
     The dress  is  on  the  clothesline   wet. 
  e.  * Bardo ist vor             dem Kühlschrank hungrig. 
     Bardo is  in-front-of the   fridge            hungry. 
  f.  * Die Tomaten wiegen neben  den Paprikas 1 Kg. 
     The tomatoes weigh  besides the paprikas 1 kg. 
  g.  * Bardo weiß    (gerade)              dort drüben die Antwort. 
     Bardo knows (at-this-moment) over there   the answer. 
The same pattern can also be observed with manner adverbials, comitatives and the 
like – that is, modifiers that elaborate on the internal functional structure of 
eventualities. State verbs combine regularly with them, whereas statives do not, as 
(6) shows. (See also Katz (2000, 2003), where it is claimed that manner adverbs 
cannot occur with stative verbs. Some apparent counterexamples to this claim will 
be discussed in section 3.) 
(6)  Manner adverbials and similar expressions:
  a.   Bardo schläft friedlich/mit  seinem Teddy/ohne     Schnuller.   
  Bardo sleeps  calmly  /with his      teddy  /without dummy. 
  b.   Carolin saß reglos       /kerzengerade    am     Tisch. 
     Carolin sat motionless/straight as a die at.the table. 
  c.   Die Perlen glänzen matt /rötlich    /feucht. 
     The pearls  gleam   dully/reddishly/moistly.  O NDAVIDSONIAN AND KIMIAN STATES 5 
  d.  * Bardo war friedlich/mit seinem Teddy/ohne     Schnuller müde. 
     Bardo was calmly   /with his       teddy/ without dummy    tired. 
  e.  * Carolin war unruhig   /geduldig durstig. 
     Carolin  was  restlessly/patiently thirsty. 
  f.  * Andrea ähnelt       mit   ihrer Tochter  Romy Schneider. 
     Andrea resembles with her   daughter Romy Schneider. 
  g.  * Bardo besitzt sparsam/spendabel   viel   Geld. 
     Bardo owns  thriftily  /generously much money. 
In sum, state verbs and statives differ sharply with respect to all of the standard 
eventuality diagnostics; see Maienborn (2003a, 2004) for further eventuality 
diagnostics yielding the same results. In view of the evidence given in (4)-(6), we 
can conclude that state verbs denote true Davidsonian eventualities, that is, 
Davidsonian states (or “D-states” for short). Statives, on the other hand, appear to 
resist a Davidsonian analysis.
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2.2. A Kimian approach to statives 
Maienborn (2003a, 2004) develops an alternative approach, according to which 
copular constructions (as exponents of the class of statives) refer instead to Kimian 
states (or “K-states” for short). Kimian states combine Kim’s (1969, 1976) notion of 
temporally bound property exemplifications
8 with Asher’s (1993, 2000) conception 
of abstract objects as mentally constructed entities.
9 Kimian states are tentatively 
characterised as follows:  
(7)  Kimian states:
  K-states are abstract objects for the exemplification of a property P at a 
holder x and a time t. 
From this definition, the properties given in (8) follow, with properties (8a) and (8b) 
due specifically to the status of K-states as abstract objects. 
(8)  Ontological properties of Kimian states:
  a.   K-states  are not accessible to direct perception and have no location 
in space. 
  b.   K-states  are accessible to (higher) cognitive operations. 
  c.   K-states can be located in time. 
(9) gives the corresponding linguistic diagnostics. 
(9)  Linguistic diagnostics for Kimian states:
  a.   K-state expressions cannot serve as infinitival complements of percep-
tion verbs and do not combine with locative modifiers. 
  b.   K-state expressions are accessible for anaphoric reference. 
  c.   K-state expressions combine with temporal modifiers. 6 CLAUDIA MAIENBORN
The characterisation of Kimian states given in (7)-(9) parallels that of Davidsonian 
eventualities in (1)-(3) and accounts for the previously observed behaviour of 
statives with respect to the eventuality diagnostics (see (4)-(6)), as well as for their 
combination with temporal modifiers, as illustrated in (10). 
(10)  Temporal modifiers:
  a.   Carolin war gestern    /immer /zweimal/tagelang müde. 
     Carolin  was  yesterday/always/twice     /for days tired. 
  b.   Die 3 war gestern     /immer/zweimal/jahrelang Bardos Glückszahl. 
     The 3 was yesterday/always/twice    /for years  Bardo’s lucky number. 
  c.   Bardo besaß  jahrelang/in seiner Jugend ein Haus am     See. 
     Bardo owned for years/in his youth        a    house at.the lake. 
  d.   Carolin kannte immer /nie    /wieder/letztes Jahr Leonardos  Adresse. 
     Carolin knew   always/never/again  /last      year Leonardo’s address. 
The K-state approach also accounts for the observation that statives are subject to a 
particular kind of anaphoric reference, as shown in (11). In (11a), for example, the 
anaphoric pronoun das refers back to some “state” of Carolin being angry. Notice 
that das cannot be analysed as a fact anaphor here, given that facts are atemporal 
(e.g. Asher 1993, 2000). 
(11)  Anaphoric reference:
  a.   Carolin ist wütend. Das wird bald vorbei sein. 
     Carolin is angry.    This will  soon over    be. 
  b.   Der Schlüssel war weg  und das  seit    dem Wochenende. 
     The key          was  away and this since the   weekend. 
  c.   Das Öl kostet 30 $. Das dauert nun schon 3 Monate. 
     The oil costs  30 $. This lasts   already      3 months. 
  d.   Carolin wog        zu  viel.    Das endete erst         mit  der Pubertät. 
     Carolin  weighed  too much. This ended not-until with the puberty. 
The evidence presented so far suggests that statives do indeed introduce an under-
lying argument that is, however, ontologically “poorer” than Davidsonian event 
arguments. The entity referred to by statives cannot be perceived, located in space, 
or vary in the way that it is realised, but it can be located in time and may serve as 
an antecedent for anaphoric reference.
10 Kimian states were designed to account for 
this behavior. I will come back to the issue of anaphoric reference in section 4. 
  (12) shows the lexical entry for English be, German sein, Spanish ser, etc. 
proposed in Maienborn (2003a, b, 2004).
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(12)  be/sein/ser…: λP λx λz [z ≈ [P(x)]] 
The copula introduces a referential argument z of type K-state, which is character-
ised by the predicate P applying to the individual x. The corresponding entry for a 
stative verb is given in (13).  O NDAVIDSONIAN AND KIMIAN STATES 7 
(13)  ähneln ‘resemble’: λy λx λz [z ≈ [resemble (x, y)]] 
(14) and (15) illustrate the compositional derivation of a copular construction and a 
stative expression, respectively. 
(14)  a.   Carolin ist müde.        (‘Carolin is tired’) 
 b.    Carolin:
12  [v | carolin (v)] 
 c.    müde:  λy [tired (y)] 
 d.    [müde  sei-]:  λx λz [z ≈ [tired (x)]] 
 e.    [
VP Carolin müde sei-]:  λz [v | z ≈ [tired (v)], carolin (v)] 
 f.    Infl:
13    λP [s | P(s)] 
 g.    [
IP Carolin ist müde]:
14 [s
z, v | s ≈ [tired (v)], carolin (v)] 
(15) a.    Carolin  ähnelt  Bardo.       (‘Carolin resembles Bardo’) 
 b.    [
V’ Bardo ähnel-]:  λx λz [u | z ≈ [resemble (x, u)], bardo (u)] 
 c.    [
VP Carolin Bardo ähnel-]:  λz [v, u | z ≈ [resemble (v, u)], bardo (u), 
         carolin  (v)] 
 d.    [
IP Carolin ähnelt Bardo]:  [s
z, v, u | s ≈ [resemble (v, u)], bardo (u), 
         carolin  (v)] 
(16) provides the corresponding composition of a Davidsonian state verb for 
purposes of comparison. (For the sake of simplicity, I adopt the neo-Davidsonian 
convention of adding the participants of an eventuality by means of thematic roles 
(cf., e.g., Parsons 1990); but see Bierwisch (to appear) for critical remarks on this 
practice.)
(16) a.    Carolin  schläft.         (‘Carolin  is  sleeping’) 
 b.    schlafen:      λx λe [ sleep (e), theme (e, x)]   
 c.    [
VP Carolin schlaf-]:      λe [v | sleep (e), theme (e, v), carolin (v)] 
 d.    [
IP Carolin schläft]:      [s
e, v | sleep (s), theme (s, v), carolin (v)] 
As (14)-(16) show, the difference between K-state and D-state expressions basically 
consists in a sortal contrast, which can be exploited in the course of building up the 
compositional meaning. That is, while eventuality arguments are suitable targets for 
locative modifiers, manner adverbials, and the like, K-state arguments won’t tolerate 
them. The difference disappears as soon as the verb’s referential argument is 
existentially bound by Infl. Therefore, the present account predicts that K-state and 
D-state expressions do not differ with respect to the admissibility of, e.g., “higher”, 
sentential modifiers; see footnote 6. 
  This ends our brief review of the theory of statives developed in Maienborn 
(2003a, 2004). 8 CLAUDIA MAIENBORN
3. SOME APPARENT COUNTEREXAMPLES 
One kind of evidence for the claim that statives do not refer to Davidsonian states 
but to something ontologically “poorer” comes from their inability to combine with 
manner adverbials, as shown in (6) above. In contrast to Davidsonian eventualities, 
which display a rich spectrum of possible realisations, the referents of statives 
apparently cannot vary in the way that they are realised. Yet, as has been occasion-
ally observed by proponents of the neo-Davidsonian approach, there seem to be at 
least some instances of manner modification with statives. This might indicate that 
we have been too hasty in dismissing the possibility that statives have a hidden 
eventuality argument and that these cases do call for such an argument after all.  
  Let us take a closer look at the kind of evidence that has been offered for this 
analysis in the literature. A representative sample is given in (17)-(20).
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(17)  John was a Catholic with great passion in his youth.  (Jäger 2001: 101) 
(18)  Peter war mit   Begeisterung Angler.  (Dölling 2003: 529) 
  Peter was with enthusiasm    angler. 
(19)  Dan is in the country illegally.  (Mittwoch to appear) 
(20)  The board is coarsely grooved.  (Parsons 2000: 86) 
In what follows, I will argue that these cases all involve some kind of non-compo-
sitional reinterpretation and therefore do not support a plain Davidsonian analysis 
for statives after all.
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  The cases of (17) and (18) are rather straightforward. What John is passionate 
about in (17) is not the state of being a Catholic but the activities associated with this 
(Kimian) state (e.g. going to mass, praying, going to confession). The same holds 
true for (18), which requires us to infer activities related to the deverbal noun Angler
‘angler’. If, however, no related activities come to mind for some predicate, such as 
being a relative (of Grit), as given in (21), then the sentence becomes odd. 
(21)  ??John was a relative (of Grit) with great passion. 
This suggests that the combination of these manner adverbials (more specifically 
mental-attitude adverbials, according to the terminology of, e.g., Ernst 2002, 2003) 
with statives does not proceed regularly but relies on a reinterpretation process based 
on event coercion (e.g. Pustejovsky 1995; Egg 2001). That is, the sortal require-
ments of mental-attitude adverbials, which are not fulfilled by stative expressions, 
force us to infer a suitable event that stands in some natural relation to the given 
stative. Once this event has been (non-compositionally) inserted, it may serve as the 
target for the adverbial’s meaning contribution. Obviously, such inferences rely 
heavily on world knowledge, and their plausibility depends on the presence of (or 
the hearer’s ability to supply) a suitable context. If statives had a Davidsonian  O NDAVIDSONIAN AND KIMIAN STATES 9 
eventuality argument right from the start, no such additional inferential processes 
would be necessary, and unacceptable cases like (21) would not be expected.  
  In Maienborn (2003a), I sketch a formal treatment of this kind of event coercion 
(based on van der Sandt’s (1992) account of presuppositions). The basic idea is that 
such event coercion takes as presuppositions the sortal requirements of a modifier 
that conflict with the modifier’s compositionally designated target and, if possible, 
accommodates these requirments by introducing a new event referent into the 
universe of discourse. 
  Notice that this approach allows us to preserve the well-established Davidsonian 
analysis of adverbial modification as conjunction of event predicates and thus to 
account for the characteristic Davidsonian inference patterns of modifier drop
(Parsons 2000), which Jäger (2001: 101) also observes for stative sentences like 
(17). 
(17’) a.   John was a Catholic with great passion in his youth. 
  b.   John was a Catholic in his youth. 
  c.   John was a Catholic with great passion. 
  d.   John was a Catholic. 
I agree with Jäger that, for example, sentence (17’a) entails (17’b-d), and both (17’b) 
and (17’c) entail (17’d). But I do not agree with his conclusion about these and 
similar data, as given below. 
So if we consider the arguments for a Davidsonian treatment [of adverbial modification; 
CM] compelling, we are forced to assume that statives have a Davidsonian argument, 
too.  Jäger (2001: 102) 
The validity of the inference pattern in (17’) does indicate that the manner adverbial 
with great passion adds a simple event predicate that can be omitted salva veritate,
given the logical rule of conjunction reduction. Yet, there is no reason to assume that 
the target of the manner adverbial is necessarily the regular referential argument of 
the stative. Rather, I would claim, the modifier’s target event originates only in the 
course of reinterpreting the stative — a process which is triggered exactly by the 
stative’s lack of an underlying eventuality argument. In short, the Davidsonian 
approach does not require us to account for inference patterns like (17’) by surface-
oriented analyses. 
  The sentences in (22) give further illustrations of manner adverbials in the broad 
sense (including other obviously event-related modifiers like instrumentals and 
comitatives) that trigger event coercion when combined with statives. 
(22)  a.   Hans ist mit   den Hunden im      Park. 
     Hans is  with the   dogs      in.the park. 
  b.   Maria war schnell  in der Stadt. 
     Maria was quickly in the town. 
  c.   Chirac war mit  der Concorde in New York. 
     Chirac was with the Concorde in New York. 10 CLAUDIA MAIENBORN
A sentence like (22a) can easily be (re)interpreted. The reason is that we are 
immediately able to associate characteristic activities with ‘being in a park’: jogging, 
relaxing, walking the dog, feeding ducks, etc. According to the argumentation 
developed above, this should not lead us to believe that (22a) is a regular, well-
formed sentence, though. In fact, a structurally identical sentence like (22’a) sounds 
rather weird — unless we can infer a plausible scenario for ‘being beside a window’ 
that allows us to accommodate the required event argument.  
(22’) a. ?? Hans ist mit den Hunden neben  dem Fenster. 
     Hans is with the dogs      beside  the  window. 
Analogously, the adverb schnell ‘quickly’ in (22b) does not modify the state of 
Maria’s being in the city but an inferred event of her going to the city. Interestingly, 
the antonym langsam ‘slowly’ in (22’b) does not support such an ingressive 
coercion by which the sentence could be “rescued”; see Maienborn (2003a: 93-94) 
for a possible explanation.  
(22’)  b. ?? Maria war langsam  in der Stadt. 
     Maria was slowly    in the town. 
An ingressive coercion is also triggered by the instrumental mit der Concorde ‘with
the Concorde’ in (22c) — and is blocked, once again, in (22’c). 
(22’)  c. ?? Der Koffer   war mit   der Concorde in New York. 
     The suitcase was with the Concorde in New York. 
Note that a sentence like (22”c) is not compatible with a scenario in which Maria 
came to Italy by plane and then travelled around using a hired car. This underlines 
the need for a non-regular, ingressive coercion in order to integrate the instrumental 
adverbial.  
(22”)  c.   Maria war mit einem Leihwagen in Italien. 
     Maria was with a       hired car     in Italy. 
We may now have a look at Mittwoch’s example (19), which is repeated here: 
(23)  Dan is in the country illegally.  (Mittwoch to appear) 
This seems like just the kind of counterevidence we are looking for: namely, true 
manner modification of a stative. Under this assumption, sentence (23) indicates that 
there is a (Davidsonian) state of the subject referent’s being located in the country 
and this state is furthermore qualified as illegal. This is shown in the logical 
representation given in (24).  O NDAVIDSONIAN AND KIMIAN STATES 11 
(24)  ∃e [ be_located_in_the_country (e) ∧ theme (e, dan) ∧ illegal (e)] 
On the basis of these and similar data, Mittwoch reaches the following conclusion: 
Hence the empirical basis for a Davidsonian argument for states [statives in my 
terminology; CM] is thinner than in the case of events; the DA [Davidsonian argument; 
CM] has less work to do. But there is no difference in principle.   
  Mittwoch (to appear: 18) 
I remain sceptical. In fact, closer inspection reveals that sentence (23) isn’t as 
“innocent” as it first appears.
17 First, if the compositionally determined meaning 
representation of the copular sentence (23) were really something like (24), why 
would the parallel sentence (25) not have a representation like (26), rather than 
being ungrammatical? (Remember that the crucial assumption of the neo-
Davidsonian approach is that every VP has a hidden eventuality argument. That is, 
trying to explain the ungrammaticality of (25) on neo-Davidsonian premises by 
assigning copula plus DP combinations an exceptional, i.e., non-Davidsonian, status 
(a) would be completely ad hoc and (b) wouldn’t even work given (more or less) 
“well-behaved” copula plus DP combinations like (17) and (18).) 
(25)  * Dan is a UK resident illegally. 
(26)  ∃e [ be_a_UK_resident (e) ∧ theme (e, dan) ∧ illegal (e)] 
Second, there are reasons to believe that the logical representation in (24) does not  
accurately reflect the meaning of sentence (23). Note that the structurally identical 
(23’) is odd, although it makes perfect sense. That is, the marginal acceptability of 
(23’) apparently has no deep conceptual source but instead originates in the 
grammatical system. 
(23’) ? The car is on the factory premises illegally. 
The German counterparts for (23)/(23’) are given in (27): 
(27)  a.   Dan  ist illegal    im      Land. 
     Dan is illegally in.the country. 
  b.  ? Das Auto ist  illegal    auf dem Fabrikgelände. 
     The car     is   illegally on  the   factory premises. 
As we might expect, occurrence of  illegally with a Davidsonian state verb is fine. 
(German intransitive parken ‘park’ refers to Davidsonian states; see also The car 
was parked on the factory premises illegally (for hours).) 
(28)  a.   Das Auto parkt  illegal    auf dem Fabrikgelände. 
     The car    parks  illegally on  the   factory premises. 12 CLAUDIA MAIENBORN
  b.   Das Auto steht   illegal    auf dem Fabrikgelände. 
     The car    stands illegally on  the   factory premises. 
What all of this suggests is that, despite first appearances, the sentence in (23) (and, 
by the same token, (23’) and (27)) does not display a regular combination of a 
stative and a manner adverbial after all. Rather, I would claim, (23) is just another 
instance of rescuing the combination of a manner adverbial with a stative via event 
coercion. That is, sentence (23) does not indicate merely that the state of the subject 
referent’s being located in the country is illegal; what is actually illegal is the 
eventuality of residing there or staying there temporarily, which is inferred on the 
basis of the relevant Kimian state. 
  Why then, one might ask, is there no analogous “rescue operation” for (23’)? In 
particular, in view of (28) it would be straightforward to reinterpret (23’) by 
inferring a Davidsonian state of, for example, the car standing on the factory 
premises. Yet the conditions under which non-compositional event coercion may 
take place are apparently more restrictive. In Maienborn (2003a), this behaviour is 
accounted for in terms of optimality-theoretic pragmatics (Blutner 1998, 2000). 
Roughly speaking, rescuing ungrammatical combinations of statives with event-
based modifiers via event coercion will be tolerated only if there is no equally 
economical way of expressing the same meaning by means of a grammatically well-
formed sentence. The violation of grammatical rules must be profitable, so to speak 
— hence the preference for inferring more or less complex activities; see Maienborn 
(2003a: chap. 6.2) for details. 
  So far, all of the counterexamples to the claim being defended here have turned 
out to have an independent explanation, allowing us to preserve our claim. The only 
remaining evidence of manner modification with statives is the sentence in (20), 
which I repeat here for convenience. 
(29)  The board is coarsely grooved.  (Parsons 2000: 86) 
In fact, (29) seems to be part of a rather productive pattern, further examples of 
which are given in (30). (See also Parsons (1990: 191-192).)
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(30)  a.   Das Brett  ist grob       gefurcht. 
     The board is  coarsely grooved. 
  b.   Das Fenster  ist weit     offen. 
     The window is  wide(ly) open. 
  c.   Die Tür   ist fest      zu. 
     The door is  tightly shut. 
  d.   Die Tür  war  locker   mit   einem Lederriemen verschlossen. 
     The door was loosely with a          leather belt   closed. 
  e.   Die Blumenbeete waren üppig    bepflanzt. 
     The flower beds   were   lavishly planted. 
  f.   Die Jacke ist dick     gefüttert. 
     The coat   is  thickly lined.  O NDAVIDSONIAN AND KIMIAN STATES 13 
Parsons (1990: 191-192) takes data like these as strong support for an underlying 
event analysis of statives.
19 According to this view, coarsely, wide, loosely, tightly, 
lavishly etc. predicate over Davidsonian states; see also Jäger (2001: 102). That is, 
the logical representation for, e.g., sentence (30b) would be something like (31). 
(31)  ∃e [ be_open (e) ∧ theme (e, the_window) ∧ wide (e)] 
In his study of manner adverbs, Geuder (2000) argues against such an analysis. He 
calls adverbs of the kind given in (29) and (30) “resultative adverbs”, which he 
analyses as predicates not over states but over resultant objects, i.e., implicit objects 
resulting from an event. That is, sentence (30b) does not indicate that there is a state 
of the window being open and that this state is wide. What is, instead, qualified by 
the adverb is the gap between the window and its frame, which results from an 
opening event. Accordingly, the other modifiers should be analysed as predicates 
over grooves in (30a), a lock in (30c/d), an ensemble of plants in (30e), and the 
lining of the coat in (30f). 
  Geuder’s (2000) analysis fits neatly into the arguments presented here. The 
relevant modifiers do not apply to an alleged (Davidsonian) state argument 
introduced by a stative but have more specific sortal requirements, which statives do 
not fulfil. Therefore, the sentences are strictly speaking ungrammatical. Under 
special circumstances, however, a hearer can resolve the sortal conflict by inferring 
an appropriate event that yields a resultant object,  which provides a suitable target 
for the modifier. That is, rather than (31), the final logical representation for (30b) 
should comprise at least the following information: 
(32)  ∃z [z ≈ [open (the_window)] ∧∃ e,x [opening (e) ∧ theme (e, the_window) 
∧ resultant-state (e) = z ∧ resultant-object (e) = x ∧ gap (x) ∧ wide (x)]]] 
Nothing but the first conjunct belongs to the regular compositional meaning of a 
copular construction. Everything else must be inferred in order for the modifier’s 
contribution to be integrated into the logical representation.  
  Additional support for the kind of analysis advocated here comes from data like 
(33), which underline the need for a mediating event. 
(33)  a. ?? Die Höhle war weit       offen. 
     The cave   was wide(ly) open. 
  b. ?? Das Marmeladenglas war weit        offen. 
     The jam-jar                was wide(ly) open 
Although caves are natural openings, the adverbial modifier weit in (33a) cannot, it 
seems, apply directly to this referent, but requires the presence of a causing event. 
That is, in order to make (33a) acceptable, we have to assume a scenario in which 
the entrance of the cave was previously closed by, for example, a wooden wall 
which then was opened, thereby creating a new, artificial opening.  14 CLAUDIA MAIENBORN
  Sentence (33b) indicates that it does not suffice to have an object like a jam jar, 
which can be opened and closed and has an opening, too. The problem here is that 
the jar’s opening exists independently of an opening event and therefore does not 
qualify as the event’s resultant object.  
  All of this shows that the (re)interpretation of sentences like (29), (30) and (33) 
(a) is dependent on world knowledge and more or less complex assumptions about 
the contextual setting, and (b) always involves some kind of event coercion.  
  In the case of adjectival passives, given the deverbal origin of the predicative 
AP, the respective event comes for free. This is why adjectival passives lend 
themselves to this construction. 
  Summing up the discussion so far, we have seen that apparent counterexamples 
to the claim that statives do not combine with manner adverbials turn out to involve 
event coercion. That is, special (extragrammatical) measures are to be taken in order 
to integrate the meaning contribution of these modifiers. The respective adverbials 
definitely do not directly modify the referential argument introduced by statives. 
Hence, they do not support but rather refute a Davidsonian analysis of statives. 
4. CONSIDERATIONS FROM TIME TRAVEL 
Does Parsons’ recently presented time travel argument fare better in providing 
support for a Davidsonian approach to statives? Parsons (2000: 88) illustrates his 
argument with the following story situated in the ancient Greece: 
  Let us assume that Socrates is sitting outside the city walls and talking to 
Parmenides at a particular time. Some time later, Socrates stumbles into a time warp 
and travels back in time. After he emerges from the time warp (as the very same 
Socrates), he ponders his discussion with Parmenides for a while. Then — at the 
very same time that his discussion with Parmenides is taking place outside the city 
walls — Socrates lies down in the marketplace, where he begins cursing the gods. 
  With this little story, Parsons invites us to assume, for the sake of the argument, 
that the two sentences in (34) and (35) are both true at the same time.
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(34)  Socrates is sitting outside the city walls and talking with Parmenides. 
(35)  Socrates is lying in the marketplace and cursing the gods. 
Now, here is the time travel argument. Consider the following inference pattern: 
(36)  a.   Socrates is sitting.  (by conjunction reduction from (34)) 
  b.   Socrates is in the market place.  (by conj. reduction from (35)) 
 c.  ∴ Socrates is sitting in the marketplace.  (by conjunction of (36a/b)) 
Given that the conclusion in (36c) is obviously false, we have to make sure that this 
inference is blocked somehow by our logical analysis of (34) and (35). If we 
analysed the positional and locative predicates in (34) and (35) as predicates that  O NDAVIDSONIAN AND KIMIAN STATES 15 
apply to the individual Socrates, we would have no means to block the invalid 
inference in (36c). If, instead, we adopt a Davidsonian analysis, according to which 
the respective predicates apply to hidden state arguments as in (37), the invalid 
inference is, correctly, blocked. ((37) gives Parsons’ (2000: 90) formulation.) 
(37)  a.   For some state s: s is a state of sitting ∧ s is a state of being outside the 
city walls ∧ Socrates is in s.
  b.   For some state s: s is a state of lying ∧ s is a state of being in the 
marketplace ∧ Socrates is in s.
 c.  ∴ For some state s: s is a state of sitting ∧ s is a state of being in the 
marketplace ∧ Socrates is in s. (invalid) 
According to (37a/b), Socrates is simultaneously in two different states. There is no 
state that has both the property of being a sitting state and that of being located in 
the marketplace. Therefore there is no way to derive the inference in (37c). This is, 
in short, the time travel argument. Parsons concludes: 
Considerations of how we describe what takes place in time travel stories suggest that 
there are underlying states in stative sentences involving state verbs and copulative 
sentences with adjectives, locatives, and nouns.  Parsons (2000: 92) 
As this quotation shows, Parsons does not distinguish between the two kinds of 
states differentiated here but takes both copular constructions and state verbs like sit 
and lie to belong to one and the same class of state expressions. So let us evaluate 
Parsons’ time travel argument in terms of the analysis advocated here.  
  As it stands, Parsons’ argument provides a further piece of evidence in favour of 
a Davidsonian approach to state verbs. Moreover, it is consistent with the behaviour 
of state verbs with respect to standard eventuality tests, as reported in section 2.1. 
Yet, as our considerations in section 2.1 have also shown, this behaviour by no 
means carries over to statives.  
  What would a stative version of Parsons’ time travel argument look like? Let us 
try (38). Of course, we shouldn’t be able to infer (38c) from (38a) and (38b). But, 
this will never happen, simply because the sentences in (38a/b) are grammatically 
ill-formed. Our previous considerations have shown that statives do not tolerate any 
kind of modifier that could fit into this pattern. 
(38)  a.   Socrates is {in an X-way, with Parmenides, at location X} hungry.  
  b.   Socrates is {in a Y-way, without Parmenides, at location Y} full.   
 c.  ∴ Socrates is {in an X-way, with Parmenides, at location X} full.   
That is, according to the analysis of statives defended here, the invalid inference 
does not emerge because there are no legitimate premises in the first place. Thus, 
Parsons’ time travel argument does not carry over to statives. Once again, we 
haven’t found the slightest hint of a hidden Davidsonian eventuality argument. 
  However, in what follows, I will show that Parsons’ argument, suitably adapted, 
may indeed provide additional support for the Kimian alternative advocated here. 16 CLAUDIA MAIENBORN
The data that my version of the time travel argument will build on is related to the 
German anaphoric expression dabei (literally: ‘thereat’).  
  As illustrated in (39), dabei adds some accompanying circumstance to its 
antecedent. Sentence (39b), for example, indicates that the Davidsonian state of 
Carolin waiting for the bus is accompanied by her reading a book. 
(39)  a.   Bardo tanzte  und klatschte dabei    mit  den Händen. 
     Bardo danced and clapped   thereat with the hands. 
  b.   Carolin wartete auf den Bus und las   dabei   ein Buch. 
     Carolin waited  for  the bus  and read thereat a    book. 
As the sentences in (40) show, dabei is not reserved for Davidsonian eventualities 
but may also be used for Kimian states. 
(40)  a.   Es war kalt und dabei   regnerisch. 
     It  was cold and thereat rainy. 
  b.   Bardo war krank und lief       dabei   ohne     Schal herum. 
     Bardo was ill       and walked thereat without scarf  about. 
  c.   Die Zwei ist eine Primzahl        und dabei  gerade. 
     The two   is  a     prime number and thereat even. 
Sentence (40b), for example, is thus interpreted as indicating that the Kimian state of 
Bardo being ill is accompanied by (possibly iterated) events of Bardo walking about 
without a scarf. (Notice that the antecedent of dabei may also be introduced by a 
copular individual-level predicate like ‘being a prime number’, as in (40c).) 
  In section 2.2, Kimian states were characterised as entities that are ontologically 
“poorer” than Davidsonian eventualities. In fact, up to now we have seen only the 
temporal dimension of Kimian states; see (10). This raises the question whether we 
need such an ontological category at all. Wouldn’t it suffice to assume that statives 
just introduce a temporal argument? This temporal argument could then serve as a 
target for temporal modification. Following this line of reasoning, we could then say 
that the anaphoric expression dabei in (40) refers back to the time interval at which 
the respective property holds and expresses temporal overlap. 
  At this point, Parsons’ time travel argument can be used to show that dabei does 
not express mere overlap between two time intervals but relates to the “substance” 
of its antecedent. That is, dabei really calls for a reification of the denotatum of 
statives, consistent with the assumption of Kimian states. 
  So let us once again tell a little time travel story about Socrates. This time, 
Socrates is outside the city walls, weak from hunger, when he stumbles into the time 
warp and is in the marketplace and full afterwards. In other words, let us take 
sentences (41a) and (41b) both to be true at the same time with the same Socrates. 
While (41c) is a valid inference from (41a/b), the conclusion in (41d) is invalid and 
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(41)  a.     Sokrates ist außerhalb der Stadtmauern und er ist dabei   hungrig. 
       Socrates is  outside     the city walls       and he is thereat hungry. 
  b.     Sokrates ist auf dem Marktplatz    und er ist dabei   satt. 
       Socrates is  in    the   marketplace and he is  thereat full. 
 c.  ∴ Sokrates ist auf dem Marktplatz  und er  ist gleichzeitig        hungrig. 
       Socrates is  in   the   marketplace and he is  at the same time hungry. 
(valid) 
 d.  ∴ Sokrates ist auf dem Marktplatz   und er  ist dabei   hungrig.  
     Socrates is  in    the   marketplace and he is  thereat hungry.  (invalid) 
This indicates that dabei does not refer back to a mere time interval but calls for a 
reification of the denotatum of its antecedent. That is, the antecedent of dabei in  
(41a), for example, must be some temporal entity qualified by the property of 
Socrates being located outside the city walls. This is precisely what Kimian states 
allow us to capture. 
5. CONCLUSION 
In a recent overview of the role that events play in linguistic semantics, 
Higginbotham (2000) reaches the following conclusion about the presence of 
Davidsonian eventuality arguments in natural language expressions:  
The arguments in favour of the hypothesis point toward a restricted theory of linguistic 
organisation: events enter semantic computation only as they are linguistically 
represented through thematic grids, and discharge of open positions takes place only 
under structurally controlled conditions. The theory pays for in ontology what it buys 
semantically — that is, the cost, if it is a cost, of the combinatorial simplification is the 
positing of objects, reference to which is not immediately manifest in linguistic 
structures.  Higginbotham (2000: 76) 
What I have done in this paper is to weigh the grammatical/ontological costs and 
benefits of postulating hidden Davidsonian arguments for statives The results are, I 
think, quite clear: the grammatical benefit tends toward zero, while the grammatical 
and ontological costs are quite high. 
  As regards the purported benefits of this hidden Davidsonian argument, if sta-
tives did have such arguments, they must, keep them very well hidden, since — in 
the course of a compositional semantic derivation, at least — they never show up. 
  As for the costs, if statives were equipped with Davidsonian eventuality argu-
ments, there would have to be some grammatical (and perhaps supplementary 
pragmatic) explanation for why their behaviour is so radically different from that of 
other eventuality expressions. Moreover, a radical redefinition of the category of 
eventualities would also seem to be required, given that the central assumption that 
eventualities are spatiotemporal entities (with functionally integrated participants) 
could no longer be maintained; see Maienborn (2004). 
  By way of conclusion, I would like to compare the Kimian approach to statives 
advocated here with two alternatives in the literature. 
  One approach is represented by the work of authors like Bäuerle (1994), Katz 
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diagnostics in section 2.1 to coincide with an opposition between events and states.
While Bäuerle (1994) and Jäger (2001) take the crucial difference to be location in 
space — they claim that events (including processes) but not states can be located in 
space —, Katz (2000, 2003) accounts for the event/state opposition in terms of the 
presence or absence of a Davidsonian eventuality argument. There appears to be no 
place for Davidsonian state verbs in this picture. However, the fact that they fully 
satisfy the criteria for Davidsonian eventuality expressions argues against any 
marginalisation of verbs like sit, stand, lie, sleep, and wait.
  What the linguistic evidence leads us to conclude, then, is that a class of static 
eventualities (= Davidsonian states) does exist; and that the event/state opposition 
cannot help us clarify the difference between eventuality expressions and statives. 
  A second approach is represented by the work of Dölling (1999), who tries to 
account for the peculiar behaviour of statives within a neo-Davidsonian framework 
by distinguishing two subtypes of states. According to Dölling, sit, stand, sleep, 
wait, etc. belong to the subtype of states that can be located in space, whereas 
statives build a subtype that has no location in space. That is, Dölling wants to 
subsume both Davidsonian and Kimian states under the ontological category of 
eventualities.
21 On this view, Kimian states would be just a special sort of event-
ualities — eventualities, that, according to our findings in section 2.1, can be neither 
perceived nor located in space and cannot vary in the way that they are realised.  
  In my view, such a move creates two major problems. First, what would be the 
smallest common denominator for events, processes, and Davidsonian states, on the 
one hand, and Kimian states, on the other? If we were to adopt such a liberal 
perspective, the only thing we could say about eventualities would be that they have 
a temporal dimension and some further content. That is, Kimian states would set the 
tone for the whole category of eventualities. This is clearly inadequate. Second, 
postulating two kinds of states as subtypes of the category of eventualities, depend-
ing on whether they can be located in space or not, is completely ad hoc. Remember 
that the subdivision of eventualities into events, processes, and states was based on 
temporal/aspectual criteria in the tradition of Vendler (1967). Why should non-
dynamic, homogeneous eventualities (i.e. states) divide into spatial and non-spatial 
subtypes? And why should the non-spatial instances moreover exclude manner 
variance? This does not follow from their ontological properties, and would have to 
be stipulated. 
  In sum, trying to adapt the ontological category of Davidsonian eventualities in 
such a way that Kimian states can be subsumed under them inevitably requires us to 
renounce all of the benefits of the Davidsonian approach. It seems worthwhile, then, 
to continue to explore the idea of supplementing the ontological category of 
Davidsonian eventualities with Kimian states, in order to account adequately for 
both eventive and stative expressions. 
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NOTES 
*   I am greatful to the volume editors and two anonymous reviewers, who gave me very valuable 
comments. Thanks also to Benjamin Shaer and Susan Olsen for checking my English. 
1  Throughout this paper, I will use the term “event” as a synonym for Bach’s (1986) notion “event-
uality”, i.e., as a cover term for events proper (accomplishments and achievements in Vendler’s (1967) 
terms), processes (Vendler’s activities) and certain (viz. Davidsonian; see below) states. 
2  Other relevant studies include Dölling (1999, 2003) and, recently, Mittwoch (to appear). See also 
Montmarquet (1980: 251), who notes that “all of Davidson’s arguments for events serve equally well 
to provide proper ontological credentials for states”, and that “states are like Davidsonian events in 
being unrepeatable particulars; they differ only in not being changes.” 
3   Parsons (2000: 88): “Based on the considerations reviewed above, it would appear that the underlying 
state analysis is not compelling for any kind of the constructions reviewed here and is not even 
plausible for some  (e.g., for nouns). There are a few outstanding problems that the underlying state 
analysis might solve, […] but for the most part the weight of evidence seems to go the other way. In 
the next section we look at some new evidence.” 
4   Verbs like sleep and wait are sometimes analysed as expressing dynamic eventualities, i.e., processes. 
Following, e.g., Dowty (1979) and Krifka (1989), I assume that the crucial difference between 
(conceptualisations of) processes and states is related to their subinterval properties: while processes 
have a lower bound on the size of subintervals that are of the same type (e.g., breath, run, glitter) states 
have no such lower bound  — i.e., they also hold at atomic times. By this criterion sleep, wait, gleam
etc. (likewise sit, stand, hang etc.) clearly belong to the category of state expressions. See Maienborn 
(2003a, 2004) for a collection of linguistic diagnostics that help distinguish state from process 
expressions. 
5  The stage-level/individual-level distinction goes back to Carlson (1977) (building on earlier work by 
Milsark 1974, 1977) and has been given an event semantic treatment by Kratzer (1995). On this 
treatment, stage-level predicates are assumed to have an additional event argument, while individual-
level predicates lack such an argument. See Maienborn (2003a) for an overview of further 
developments based on Kratzer’s approach. 
6  Note that when using locatives as eventuality diagnostics we have to make sure that we are checking 
for locative VP-modifiers. These should not be confused with frame-setting locatives such as (i)-(iii). 
The latter, being sentential modifiers, do not relate to an underlying eventuality argument, but instead 
provide a semantically underspecified domain restriction for the overall proposition; see Maienborn 
(2001) for more details about the syntax and semantics of frame-setting locatives. 
  (i)  Bei Kerzenlicht ähnelt        Carolin ihrem Bruder. 
      In candle light   resembles Carolin  her     brother. 
  (ii)  In der Wiener Staatsoper  heißt       der Souffleur “Maestro Suggeritore”. 
           In the Vienna  state opera is-called the prompter  “Maestro Suggeritore”. 
  (iii)  Im      Kindergarten war Bardo brav. 
      In.the kindergarten  was Bardo well-behaved. 
7  In Maienborn (2003b) these eventuality diagnostics are applied to the Spanish copula forms ser and 
estar (which are generally considered to be lexical exponents of the stage-level/individual-level 
distinction). The results reported in that study confirm this conclusion: neither ser nor estar meets any 
of the eventuality criteria. The Spanish copula forms do not differ from their German or English 
counterparts in this respect. That is, there is no good reason to adopt an event-based analysis of 
ser/estar, as proposed within the stage-level/individual-level paradigm. Maienborn (2003b) develops a 
discourse-based account of ser/estar instead. 
8  While Kim understood his proposal as an alternative to Davidson’s approach, I think of K-states as a 
supplement to Davidsonian eventualities. 
9   According to Asher (1993, 2000), abstract objects (like facts and propositions) are introduced for 
efficient natural language processing and other cognitive operations but do not exist independently of 
them. Roughly speaking, abstract objects exist only because we talk and think about them.  
10  It might be worth pointing out that our characterisation of K-states as having no location in space (see 
(8a)) does not exclude copular constructions with locative main predicates, as illustrated in (i). Like 20 CLAUDIA MAIENBORN
any other copular construction, (i) assigns a property (here: the property of being located in the garden) 
to the subject referent. That is, locative copular constructions do not locate some underlying state 
argument, but the object (or eventuality) referred to by the subject referent. 
  (i)  Carolin ist im      Garten. 
      Carolin is  in.the garden. 
11  The following representations use the formal framework of Discourse Representation Theory (DRT; 
Kamp 1981; Kamp and Reyle 1993). See Asher (1993) for the compositional DRT variant with λ-
abstraction employed here. I use a flat notation for DRSs: discourse referents are separated from DRS 
conditions by a straight line; see the notational convention in (i). 
 (i)  Notation:    λy λx … [discourse referents | DRS conditions] 
  Variables are sorted as follows. x, y, u, v: individuals; z: K-states; e: eventualities; s: K-states ∪
eventualities; P, Q, R: first-order predicates.  
      Asher (1993: 145f) defines “≈” as relating a discourse referent for an abstract object (facts, 
propositions etc.) to a DRS that characterises this discourse referent; cf. Maienborn (2003a, 2004) for 
details.
12  For the sake of simplicity, I will assume that a proper name introduces a discourse referent v into the 
universe of discourse, as in (14b). 
13  Note that Infl as defined in (14f) introduces a discourse referent s for the referential argument of the 
VP. This corresponds to the operation of existential closure in alternative frameworks. That is, in the 
notation of predicate logic, the DRS for Infl in (14f) would correspond to (i).  
 (i)  Infl:    λP ∃s [P(s)]. 
14  Note that in the course of applying Infl (14f) to an K-state VP like (14e), Infl’s discourse referent s 
which originally ranges over eventualities and K-states is narrowed down to the domain of K-states. 
This is indicated in (14g) by the addition of a superscript z to s within the universe of discourse. 
15  In the following, I will concentrate on the combination of manner adverbials with copular construct-
ions. Cases of (apparent) manner modification with stative verbs like know personally, love passion-
ately, and believe firmly are discussed in Katz (2000, 2003).  
16  As one reviewer remarks, Jäger’s sentence (17) is judged as rather bad English by native speakers. This 
fits well with the view defended here, according to which a sentence like (17) might be interpretable 
somehow by some mechanism of meaning coercion (see below), but it nevertheless remains 
ungrammatical because the copular construction, lacking an eventuality argument, does not support a 
compositional integration of the manner adverbial. 
17  Thanks to Anita Mittwoch for bringing this example to my attention and for discussing it with me. 
Thanks also to Thomas Ernst and Benjamin Shaer for discussion and judgements. 
18    Note that the participial forms in (30) are unambiguously socalled “adjectival passives” (i.e. 
combinations of the copula be plus a deverbal adjective), since “verbal” (i.e. true) passives take the 
auxiliary werden in German; see,  e.g., Kratzer (1994, 2000). 
19  Parsons (2000) is a bit more sceptical. With respect to sentence (29) he notes: “The problem about 
these constructions is that they seem to occur only when the adjective is spelled like the past participle 
of a verb: grooved is an example. The construction is thus quite restricted and special and cries out for 
some special explanation” (Parsons 2000: 86). For this reason, I will concentrate on (30b) The window 
is wide open in the discussion in the text. My claim will be that not only adjectival passives but also 
true adjectives cry for a special, non-compositional explanation. 
20  Parsons admits that the assumption of time travel raises intricate philosophical problems. But, he goes 
on, “contemplation of cases of time travel can force us to clarify our theories about ordinary situations” 
(Parsons 2000: 88). 
21   The proposals of Dowty (1979) and Bach (1986) point in the same direction. According to Dowty 
(1979: 180ff), sit, stand, lie, etc. belong to the subtype of“interval statives” (see the table in Dowty 
1979: 184). Bach (1986: 6) distinguishes “dynamic states” described by, e.g., sit, stand, and lie from 
“static states” described by statives.  O NDAVIDSONIAN AND KIMIAN STATES 21 
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